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ABSTRACT 
 
International Differences in the Family Gap in Pay: 
The Role of Labor Market Institutions*
 
Using microdata for 35 countries over the period 1985-1994-2002 we find that labor market 
institutions traditionally associated to more compressed wage structures are associated to a 
higher family gap. Our results indicate that these policies reduce the price effect of having 
children but aggravate the human capital loss due to motherhood. We also find evidence that 
policies that help women continue in the same job after childbirth decrease the family gap. Of 
all the countries we study, mothers in Southern Europe suffer the biggest family gap and our 
analysis indicates that this is due to the bad combination of labor market policies in these 
countries. Our results are robust to specification changes and indicate that the main reason 
mothers lag behind other women in terms of earnings is the loss of accumulated job market 
experience caused by career breaks around childbirth. 
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1. Introduction and Literature Review 
In the last thirty years the Spanish fertility rate has decreased fifty percent and is 
today one of the lowest worldwide. The Spanish population froze between 1989 and 
1993 and decreased in absolute numbers in 1991 (I.N.E. 2006). At the same time, a 
growing percentage of young and middle age Spanish women joined the labor market, 
in an astonishing increase of the female participation rate from 28.8% in 1975 to 45.7% 
in 2005 (I.N.E. 2006). The case of Spain clearly suggests that the functioning of labor 
markets is an important determinant of the cost of having children and of fertility 
decisions. It has been argued for example that high unemployment and unstable 
contracts, common in Southern Europe, raise the cost of having children and depress 
fertility, particularly among younger women (Adserà 2002). More generally, the 
different institutional framework of labor markets across countries can be an important 
determinant of the differences in the labor cost of having children internationally and 
there is evidence that the wage penalty associated to motherhood varies quite 
substantially across countries. For example, among the thirty five countries we analyze 
in this study the mean and the standard deviation of the estimated family gap in earnings 
– the difference in earnings between mothers and other women – is .21 and .18 log 
points respectively.  
In this paper we investigate the role of labor market institutions to explain the 
differences in the earnings gap between mothers and non-mothers internationally.  
Several studies have looked at the family gap internationally (Davies & Pierre 
2005, Todd 2001, Harkness & Waldfogel 1999, Sigle-Rushton & Waldfogel 2004). 
These studies find that the family gap varies considerable across countries, but none has 
looked in detail at the role of labor market institutions in explaining these differences. 
Gornick et al. (1997) compares fourteen OECD countries, as of the middle-to-late 
1980s, with respect to their provision of policies that support mothers' employment, but 
that study does not draw a link between these institutions and the family gap. Our paper 
is the first attempt to study empirically the relationship between the family gap and the 
regulation of labor across a large sample of countries. We calculate the family gap in 
thirty five different countries and we test the relationship between these family gaps and 
the different regulation of labor in each country during the period 1985-1994-2002. 
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The effect of labor market institutions on the family gap is ambiguous. Reasons 
for the difference in earnings between mothers and non-mothers include a price effect, a 
human capital effect and a heterogeneity effect (Waldfogel 1998b). According to the 
price effect, one reason mothers lag behind other women in terms of earnings is that 
firms pay women with children a lower wage compared to other women, even after 
controlling for individual characteristics. This price effect could reflect the lower effort 
exerted by mothers in their jobs or instead could be due to employers’ discrimination 
against mothers. According to the human capital effect of motherhood another reason 
there is a gap between the earnings of mothers and non-mothers is that women with 
children accumulate less human capital (job market experience) because they interrupt 
their careers to take care of children (Erosa et al. 2002). 
Labor market institutions such as the minimum wage and collective bargaining 
coverage can attenuate the price effect of motherhood by setting a floor on wages 
received by mothers. In the case of the human capital effect, the impact of labor market 
institutions on the family gap is more ambiguous.3 4 Labor market institutions such as 
parental leave and job protection regulations can reduce the family gap by lowering the 
frequency of job transitions around childbirth. However, too generous parental leave 
can lead to long periods out of employment and a large loss of experience (Waldfogel 
1998), and too strict firing restrictions or too high wage floors can lead to 
unemployment (Nickell 1997, Siebert 1997), which would increase the duration of job 
interruptions. We find that tenure enhancing institutions, such as parental leave, job 
protection regulations and restrictions to the use of temporary contracts, are associated 
to a lower family gap. We also find that wage compressing institutions, such as 
                                                          
3 Lundberg & Rose (2000) find that job interruptions due to motherhood cause the time devoted to 
work by the husband to increase, partially offsetting the negative effect on the mother’s earnings. 
4 A third explanation for the family gap results from an heterogeneity bias, since it is possible that 
being a mother is correlated with other variables, unobservable, that affect the earnings potential of a 
particular woman. In this case, the estimated family gap would simply reflect the effect of these 
unobservable variables on the earnings potential of mothers but not necessarily the fact that having 
children depresses wages in itself. In this paper we use cross-sectional data and hence we are not able to 
quantify the extent of heterogeneity bias in our sample. However, since our analysis consists of a cross 
country comparison, all we need is that the correlation between unobservable variables and motherhood, 
as well as the distribution of the former in the population, is similar across countries. 
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unemployment benefits and trade union coverage, are instead associated to a larger 
family gap. Furthermore, our results indicate that this type of policies reduce the price 
effect of motherhood but are associated to a larger human capital loss.  
Our paper relates also to the literature that has studied the link between labor 
market institutions and the gender gap. We use the same data set and methodology to 
estimate the family and the gender gaps, which allows us to compare the effect of the 
same group of labor market institutions on each of these gaps. In a study of the gender 
gap in twenty two countries, Blau and Kahn (2003) use the same dataset as ours and 
find that labor market institutions that compress the wage structure overall also tend to 
reduce the wage gap between men and women. Other studies have concluded that a 
reduction of the family gap would cause the gender gap to fall as well (Waldfogel 1998, 
Waldfogel 1998b, Millimet 2000) since a large percentage of women are also mothers 
(60% in our sample).  
We argue that labor market institutions can have very different effects on the 
earnings differential between men and women on the one hand and women with 
children and non-mothers on the other. One key difference between mothers and non-
mothers is that mothers’ labor turnover is much higher than that of non-mothers 
(Anderson et al. 2003, Data & Smith 2002, Phipps et al. 2001, Klerman & Leibowitz 
1994). The literature has also found a close link between past decisions about labor 
market participation and women’s current wage level (Eckstein & Wolpin 1989, Altû & 
Miller 1998) with a particularly strong effect in the case of job interruptions due to 
motherhood (Gronau 1988, Korenman & Neumark 1992). Furthermore, these effects 
tend to persist in time because turnover probabilities depend negatively on tenure and 
experience (Topel & Ward 1992). All this literature suggests that tenure enhancing 
policies will reduce the family gap to a larger extent than the gender gap and that wage 
compressing policies can have opposing effects on the two gaps if they result in high 
unemployment which hurts high turnover workers such as mothers the most.  
Our detailed analysis of the link between labor market institutions and the gender 
and family gaps confirms these hypotheses. We find that wage compressing institutions 
have a markedly different impact on the family gap and on the gender gap. In particular, 
we find that while the gender gap decreases with the intensity of wage compressing 
institutions, these institutions are associated to a bigger family gap, with a particularly 
strong effect for collective bargaining coverage.  
 4
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data we use in this 
paper. Section 3 describes the analytical framework. Section 4 shows the results. In 
section 5 we test the robustness of the results. Section 6 concludes.  
2. The Data 
In this study we use two types of data: microdata to estimate the gender and 
family earnings gap, and data on the intensity of various labor market institutions across 
countries. The data on labor market institutions is explained in detail in the next section. 
In relation to the data that we use to estimate the gender and family gaps, we use 
microdata for thirty five countries from the 1988, 1994 and 2002 annual files of the 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). The International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP) is a continuing annual program of cross-national collaboration on 
surveys covering topics in different areas. Each year, the ISSP administers a common 
set of basic demographic information questions, such as age, education, gender, income, 
employment status, marital status, etc. This common set of questions is complemented 
every year by additional questions on a different topic of social interest. In the years 
1988, 1994 and 2002, the ISSP conducted the ‘Family and Changing Gender Roles’ 
studies, which in addition to the common set of questions, asked respondents questions 
related to motherhood, childbearing and job market interruptions around childbirth.  
The advantage of the ISSP data is the large number of countries for which there is 
information: thirty five in our sample. Its disadvantage is the small size of some 
country-year samples, although the ISSP questions are asked of a probability-based 
nation-wide sample of adults. In section 4 we describe the methodology that we use in 
this study, which we think helps to overcome the potential problems of the small sample 
sizes. 
Table 1 shows the list of countries, the years each country appears in the data and 
the earnings concept being asked in the questionnaire. The third column also includes 
our own labeling of each country into six groups. Throughout the paper we present 
results for each of these groups of countries. As can been in the table, in the ISSP 
respondents report earnings differently depending on the country. While in some 
countries respondents report earnings before taxes in others they report earnings after 
taxes. In our initial models we included a dummy variable indicating whether the 
earnings concept was gross or net of taxes. This dummy variable was never significant 
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for the estimation of the family or the gender gap.5 Also, for some countries, the 
earnings are top coded. When this was the case, we followed two alternatives: to either 
drop these observations from the analysis, or to assign to each the lower bound of the 
income interval. In each case we obtained practically identical results and we present 
here the results with these observations dropped. 
The ISSP data does not give information on the number of weeks worked. 
However, respondents report the number of hours worked per week, which we used to 
fit earnings regressions conditional on part-time or full-time employment, where part-
time employment is defined as working less than 35 hours per week. 
In relation to the human capital variables, we were able to construct years of 
education for each individual in each country. With respect to labor market experience, 
we don’t have information about years of experience or job tenure. We constructed 
potential experience combining the information on years of education and age of the 
individual. Although years of experience and/or job tenure are both important 
determinants of the earnings of mothers and non-mothers, our focus here is on 
quantifying the earnings gap between mothers and other women, and on relating that 
gap to various labor market institutions. A different question of course, is to what extent 
the existing gap is due to a price effect or to a human capital effect, a question that we 
do not attempt to answer here.    
With respect to the labor market institutions, in this study we look at two groups 
of institutions and construct time-varying measures of each one for as many countries as 
possible. Table 2 shows for each country, whether there is information available on each 
labor market institution and whether the variable is time-varying. 
First, we look at institutions that potentially help mothers continue with the same 
job after a child is born. In this group, we construct measures of the following three 
policies: parental leave, impediments to the firing of workers and restrictions to the use 
of temporary contracts by firms. Information about these policies comes from the 
O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2001) in the case of parental leave and the O.E.C.D. 
Employment Outlook (2004) in the case of job protection regulations. The Data 
                                                          
5 Blau and Kahn (2003) report similar results in their study that also uses the ISSP data for years 
1985-94, which suffers from similar variation in the way the earnings concept is reported.  
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Appendix shows detailed information of each one of these policies for each country in 
our sample.  
We use two measures of parental leave policies, the maximum duration of 
parental leave (in weeks) and the earnings replacement rate while on leave. For the 
protection of jobs, we use an index of the overall strictness of protection of regular 
contracts and an index of the restrictions on the use of temporary contracts. The first 
index combines information on various aspects of the protection of workers under 
regular contracts against dismissal (indefinite contracts), such as the period of advance 
notice, administrative obstacles to the dismissal of workers, the level of severance 
payments and cases considered unfair dismissal (usually subject to higher severance 
payments). The index on the restrictions to the use of temporary contracts or fixed-term 
contracts – usually subject to low or no protection against termination – measures to 
what extent and in which cases temporary contracts are valid according to the law.6 In 
the case of job protection measures, the information is time varying, with data given for 
the eighties, nineties and two thousands, and we assign the value for the eighties to 
observations in the ISSP dataset for 1988, the value for the nineties to observations for 
1994 and the value for two thousands to observations for 2002. 
Theoretically, the impact of parental leave on the family gap is ambiguous 
(Waldfogel, 1998). On the one hand, parental policies help mothers continue with the 
same employer/job after childbirth, allowing women with children to accumulate job 
market experience and/or maintain firm specific human capital. On the other hand, 
generous parental leave might induce mothers to stop working for longer periods than 
otherwise, with the corresponding bigger loss of human capital.  
The impact of job protection regulations on the family gap is also ambiguous. Job 
protection regulations help mothers continue with the same employer after childbirth 
and since they benefit mothers as long as they continue working, they discourage job 
interruptions. However, job protection regulations, if too strict, can lead to 
                                                          
6 The O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2004) provides information on other aspects of the 
regulation of temporary contracts such as the maximum number of contracts that can be signed 
consecutively by the same firm and workers. The effect of these on job transitions is less clear than that of 
the index we use here and we found these other aspects to be non-significant when we included them in 
our models.  
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unemployment because in the presence of strict firing procedures firms become too 
cautious in the hiring process, and in the presence of unemployment, mothers that 
decide either voluntarily or involuntarily to interrupt their career to take care of children 
might go through a longer job interruption than otherwise. Furthermore, in dual labor 
markets workers with regular contracts benefit from strict firing restrictions while 
workers under temporary contracts get low or no protection against dismissal (Dolado et 
al, 2005). The restrictions to the use of temporary contracts are important here, because 
in some countries firms easily get around the strict regulation of regular contracts by 
employing a worker under a series of consecutive temporary contracts. When there is 
the possibility of using temporary contracts, job tenure is important to gain access to a 
protected job, because the law usually establishes a limited duration and limited number 
of consecutive fixed-term contracts. In this context, it is possible that mothers, with 
lower average tenure than non-mothers, disproportionately concentrate in the secondary 
market, under temporary hence unprotected contracts. 
The second type of labor market institutions we consider is traditionally 
associated with wage compression, that is, with a lower wage gap between various 
groups of workers, such as male and female (Blau and Kahn, 2003). In this group we 
gather information about the following institutions: collective bargaining coverage, 
unemployment benefits, and the minimum wage. We get the information on the 
minimum wage from the O.E.C.D. minimum wage database, which reports the ratio of 
the minimum wage to the average wage for 1986 and 2000. We assign the 1986 value to 
observations in the ISSP for 1988, and the 2000 value to the observations for 1994 and 
2002. We get the information on collective bargaining coverage from the O.E.C.D. 
Employment Outlook (2004), which reports time varying measures of union coverage, 
for the eighties, the nineties and the two thousands. Having time varying information is 
important here because of the changes in many O.E.C.D. countries during the eighties 
and nineties in the direction of lowering the power of unions (Nickell 1997, Siebert 
1997). Information on the level of unemployment benefits was taken from Botero et al., 
(2004). This is a one-time index of the generosity of unemployment benefits, combining 
information on the replacement rate and the duration of unemployment benefits, 
covering all except one of the thirty five countries in our sample.  
The effect of wage compressing institutions on the family gap is also ambiguous. 
The bargaining of wages by unions and the minimum wage may raise the relative wage 
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of mothers, provided that women with children are at the bottom of the wage 
distribution. Unemployment benefits may help mothers who stopped working and want 
to return to the labor market to get a higher wage than otherwise by allowing them to 
search longer and find a better match. However, these institutions may lead to 
unemployment causing mothers who decide to transition out of employment to suffer a 
long career break.  
Table 3 shows the correlation coefficients between these various labor market 
institutions. On average countries with stricter protection of regular jobs also have more 
generous parental leave policies, more generous unemployment benefits and more 
powerful unions. Furthermore, stricter protection of regular contracts is on average 
coupled with fewer restrictions on the use of temporary contracts by firms, a clear 
indication of dual markets with respect to job protection. As we will se next, this 
positive correlation between policies is important to understand the weak association 
between the gender and the family gaps across countries.   
3. Analytical Framework 
Our empirical analysis consists of two steps. In the first step we estimate the 
family gap in each of 35 countries using the microdata available. In the second step, we 
estimate reduced form specifications with the family gap as the endogenous variable 
and the various types of labor market institutions as explanatory variables. 
With respect to the estimation of the family gap, we follow the methodology of 
Blau and Kahn (2003) which uses the same dataset as ours to analyze the gender gap in 
twenty two countries.7 We start by using individual data to estimate log earnings 
equations separately for mothers and non-mothers for each country j and year t: 
ijtjtijtjtijt
ijtjtijtjtijtjtjtijt
eKKIDSBX
HRFULLbHRPARTbPARTbbEARN
+⋅+⋅+
+++= 3210ln
 (1) 
where i indexes individuals; lnEARN is the natural log of earnings; PART is a 
dummy variable for part-time employment, defined as working less than thirty five 
hours per week; HRPART and HRFULL are interactions of weekly work hours with 
part-time and full-time status; X is a vector of explanatory variables, including the usual 
                                                          
7 For a more detailed description of this methodology see Blau and Kahn (2003), pp. 115-123.  
 9
human capital variables of education, potential experience and the square of potential 
experience; KIDS is a vector of four dummy variables included in the earnings 
equations of mothers only, indicating whether the mother has one child, two children, 
three children or four or more children. Unfortunately, the ISSP data does not give 
information on the number of children so we had to estimate this variable combining 
information on the marital status of women and the number of members in the 
household. Since we identify children as long as they live with their mother in the same 
household, we restricted our sample to women younger than 50 years of age. Having 
estimated (1), we compute the family gap in pay in each country and year as follows:  
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⋅+⋅+
+++−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⋅+
+++
=
MjtMUStMjtMUSt
MUStMjtMUStMjtMUStMjtMjt
NMjtNMUSt
NMUStNMjtNMUStNMjtNMUStNMjtNMjt
jt
KKIDSBX
HRFULLbHRPARTbPARTbb
BX
HRFULLbHRPARTbPARTbb
FAMILYGAP
3210
3210
 (2) 
where NM refers to non-mothers, US refers to the US values and M refers to 
mothers. According to equation (2), FAMILYGAP is an estimate of the gap in earnings 
between mothers and non-mothers in each country and year on the assumption that the 
group of mothers and non-mothers in each country-year microdata file have the same 
average levels of measured characteristics (i.e., PART, HRPART, HRFULL, X and 
KIDS variables) as the group of U.S. mothers and non-mothers for that year. Equation 
(2) provides a simulated family gap that removes the effect of differences in observable 
characteristics across countries. However, labor market institutions can still have an 
effect on the family gap in at least two ways. First, labor market institutions can be 
important for the different returns to the same characteristics for mothers and non-
mothers. Second, since differences in measured characteristics between mothers and 
non-mothers remain (at the U.S. level) labor market institutions that affect the price of 
these characteristics will play a role in determining the family gap.  
In relation to the human capital effect component of the family gap, equation (2) 
allows for institutions to play a role with respect to job market experience. The reason is 
that the X vector includes potential experience (age - education years - six), instead of 
actual experience. We then remove cross country differences in potential experience, 
but not in actual experience. Suppose for example that in country j job protection is 
weak and because of this mothers lose their job frequently and spend a lot of time out of 
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employment when children are born. In equation (2) the coefficient of potential 
experience would be relatively low, compared to another country. In general, when the 
coefficient of potential experience is low this could mean either that returns to 
experience are low or that mothers accumulate less experience. This will be true in 
general for all variables potentially correlated with actual experience, such as the 
number of kids and possibly part-time status. With respect to the other variables in X 
besides potential experience (education, part-time status and the number of kids), 
equation (2) does not allow for cross country differences in these variables to play a 
role. When we estimated the family gap allowing for cross country differences in these 
variables to play a role we obtained very similar results, although noisier in general. We 
think that removing international differences in observable characteristics (with the 
exception of actual experience) is an advantage of our methodology because in many 
cases the size of the country-year samples are too small for the distribution of X’s in our 
data to be representative. Besides, our hypothesis is that the most important effect of 
labor market institutions on human capital variables is their impact on the accumulation 
of job market experience. 
With respect to the reduced form specifications, our sample consists of 54 
country-year observations. Following Blau and Kahn (2003), we start by running 
regressions of the family gap on two measures of male wage dispersion. The hypothesis 
here is that observed male wage inequality is influenced by both heterogeneity of 
productivity characteristics and by the returns to these characteristics, being the effect of 
labor market institutions more important in the latter. The two measures of male wage 
dispersion remove then the effects of international differences in measured 
heterogeneity. First, for each country and year we take the U.S. sample of men for that 
year and compute a predicted log wage for each U.S. male using the coefficients from 
the wage regression for country j and year t. We then compute two measures of wage 
dispersion: the standard deviation of low wages (SD) and the standard deviation of the 
residuals (SDRES). These two measures give us an idea of the degree of wage 
inequality in country j at year t that results from the returns to measured and 
unmeasured characteristics in that country and year:    
jtjtjtjtjt eYYEARbSDRESbSDbFAMILYGAP +⋅+⋅+⋅+= 210  (3) 
where YEAR is a vector of year dummies and e is the error term. We then turn to 
the reduced form specifications that include the various labor market institutions we are 
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interested in. All of our models include year dummies and take the following 
specification: 
jtjtjtjt eYYEARBIINSbFAMILYGAP +⋅+⋅+= 0  (4) 
where INS is a vector of explanatory variables indicating the level of the various 
labor market institutions; YEAR is a vector of year dummies and e is the error term. 
4.  Results 
Figure 1 offers a first look at the family gap across the thirty five countries in our 
sample. In the figure, we plot the family gap computed using the methodology 
described in Section 3 (FAMILYGAP) against the family gap in the raw data, i.e., 
allowing the set of observable characteristics to vary across countries and groups of 
women. 
From the figure we can see that there is a positive correlation between the two 
measures of the family gap (the correlation coefficient is .52). The negative values for 
some countries and years disappear when we impose the US level of observable 
characteristics of mothers and non-mothers to the rest of countries, an indication that 
some of these negative values were driven by the different characteristics of mothers 
and non-mothers in those countries rather than the returns to those characteristics. As 
we argued before, we think that this is an advantage of our methodology, because it is 
hard to draw conclusions from the different distributions of characteristics across 
countries, considering the small size of some of the samples in the ISSP data set.8  
Table 4 shows the average family gap and the two measures of wage dispersion 
for the five groups of countries in our sample. For comparison purposes, the table also 
shows the earnings gap between men and women, the gender gap, calculated with 
identical methodology as the family gap. The table indicates that Southern European 
countries have the largest family gap, even though the gender gap is relatively small 
there. More generally, there is only a weak correlation between the family and the 
                                                          
8 The three observations with negative numbers in FAMILYGAP correspond to Philippines 2002, 
Czech Republic 2002 and Taiwan 2002. When we dropped these observations the results we obtained 
were practically identical, although the fit of the various models was slightly lower. 
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gender gaps (the correlation coefficient between the two is only .1017), which suggests 
that the impact of the various labor market policies in each gap might be quite different. 
Table 5 shows the results for the OLS estimation of equation (3). The table 
indicates that higher wage dispersion – higher returns to observable and unobservable 
characteristics – is associated to a higher gender gap but only weakly associated to a 
higher family gap. Residual inequality is not statistically significant for both gaps and 
the standard deviation of wages is statistically significant at the 10% level in the case of 
the gender gap and at the 25% level in the case of the family gap. One possible 
explanation of the results in Table 5 is that labor market institutions are more effective 
at setting a wage floor in the case of women in general than in the case of mothers in 
particular. In dual labor markets high-tenure and high-experience workers benefit from 
social policies disproportionately compared to low-tenure and low-experience workers. 
It has been argued that unions fight harder for insiders than outsiders. Also, in some 
countries, Spain being an example, the severance package grows with tenure and both 
the duration and replacement rate of unemployment benefits grows with job market 
experience, giving high-tenure and high-experience workers more power to reject wage 
cuts or even bargain for a wage increase. Another explanation is that mothers 
accumulate less human capital in the presence of labor market institutions that compress 
wages, something that could happen if wage compressing institutions lead to 
unemployment and this causes mothers who transition out of the labor market to go 
through long unemployment spells.   
In Tables 6 to 8 we show the results of estimating various reduced form 
specifications where, instead of the male wage dispersion measures we include proxies 
for labor market institutions which can affect wage compression overall and the family 
gap in particular.     
Table 6 shows the results for the group of what we call tenure enhancing policies: 
the duration of parental leave (LEAVEWKS), the replacement rate of earnings while in 
parental leave (LVREP), the protection of regular jobs (PROTREG) and restrictions to 
the use of temporary contracts by firms (RESTRICTEMP). Across all specifications, 
each of these policies is associated to a lower family gap, i.e., the more generous 
parental leave, the stricter the restrictions to job termination and the stricter the 
restrictions on the use of temporary contracts, the lower the family gap. The 
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significance of parental leave duration is greater than that of its replacement rate and 
when parental leave is combined with job protection the fit of the model improves 
although the impact of parental leave falls and becomes insignificant. The effect of job 
protection and of restrictions to the use of temporary contracts is large and highly 
significant in all specifications. For example, using the coefficients in the complete 
specification, if the group of Liberal countries had the same level of job protection of 
regular jobs as the group of Nordic countries, the family gap would fall in the former by 
21.9% or .07 log points. Also, if Southern European countries had the same duration of 
parental leave as Nordic countries, the family gap would fall in the former by .048 log 
points or 13.4%.  
Overall, these results indicate that policies that help mothers continue with the 
same employer/job after childbirth reduce the wage penalty associated to motherhood. It 
should be recalled that the effect of parental leave on the family gap is theoretically 
ambiguous, since generous parental leave might induce mothers to stay out of 
employment for longer periods of time than otherwise, with the corresponding loss of 
experience. The results in Table 6 confirm those obtained by previous studies using 
British and U.S. data (Waldfogel 1995, Waldfogel 1998), and suggest that the net effect 
of parental leave on human capital is a positive one.  
The comparison between the family and the gender gap in Table 6 indicates that 
while parental leave is associated to a lower gender gap, the protection of jobs bears no 
relation with it. These results are intuitive. Whereas women tend to benefit 
disproportionately, compared to men, from parental leave policies, instead, job 
protection regulations and restrictions on the use of temporary contracts are important 
for both men and women.  
We turn now to the analysis of wage compressing institutions. Table 7 shows the 
results for collective bargaining coverage. We look at two measures of collective 
bargaining coverage: the percentage of the work force directly or indirectly affected by 
unions’ agreements (COVERAGE)9 and the ranking of countries in relation to trade 
union coverage (RANK). The reason for including this second measure is that the 
                                                          
9 This measure is normally bigger than trade union density, which measures the percentage of 
workers directly affiliated to unions or directly represented by them. 
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O.E.C.D. reported measure of trade union coverage is top coded for some countries. The 
RANK variable however, is insignificant and we dropped it from all except the initial 
specification. Looking at the impact of trade union coverage on the family gap, the 
results in the table indicate that more powerful unions are associated to a bigger family 
gap, since the sign of the coefficient is positive across all specifications. Furthermore, 
the magnitude and the significance of the coefficient grow as we include other 
covariates such as parental leave policies and job protection regulations. The reason for 
this is that in our sample of countries there exists a positive correlation between trade 
union coverage, parental leave and job protection regulations (see Table 3), and the 
effect of trade union coverage on the family gap is opposed to that of parental leave and 
job protection. In the last specification, not only the size and the significance of the 
trade union coefficient grows, but also that of the parental leave and job protection 
coefficients, compared to Table 6. Furthermore, combining these four policies in the 
same specification improves the fit of the model, which now explains 37% of the 
variation in the family gap across time and across countries.10 With respect to the size of 
the COVERAGE coefficient, the results in the table indicate that if, for example, 
Southern European countries had the same level of trade union coverage as the group of 
Liberal countries then the family gap would fall in the former by .057 log points or 
16%.  
With respect to the effect of trade union coverage on the gender gap, Table 7 
shows an important contrast, since trade union coverage is associated to a bigger family 
gap but to a lower gender gap. The negative effect of trade union coverage on the 
gender gap is very strong in magnitude and significance, even when we control for 
parental leave, confirming the results of previous studies (Blau and Kahn 2003). This 
result confirms our previous intuition that unions fight harder for the job market 
prospects of men and women than for mothers in particular. If mothers have a weaker 
attachment to the labor market due to their relatively high turnover rates (Anderson et 
al. 2003, Data & Smith 2002, Phipps et al. 2001, Klerman & Leibowitz 1994), and if 
                                                          
10 It should be noted that the number of observations changes across the different specifications. 
This is due to the fact that we have information on a specific covariate for some countries but not for 
others. We ran the same regressions limiting our sample to the set of countries for which information on 
all covariates exists, and the results we obtained were practically identical to the ones shown in the tables.  
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unions protect insiders more than outsiders (Lindbeck & Snower 2001), then unions will 
have a negligible effect on the family gap but not on the gender gap. However, the fact 
that the sign of the coefficient in the case of the family gap is positive and significant 
suggests that unions have an additional negative impact on the family gap. It is possible 
that unions, while raising the relative wage of those at the bottom of the wage 
distribution, women in general, also lead to unemployment which hits particularly 
strong those with a weaker attachment to the labor market, such as mothers. The fact 
that female unemployment rates are positively correlated to both trade union coverage 
(the correlation coefficient is .59 in our sample) and to the size of the family gap, 
supports this hypothesis. The results in Table 7 are also important to understand the 
apparently weak association between the family and the gender gaps across countries, 
something that is not surprising considering that labor market institutions have a 
different impact on the two gaps and that there is variation of labor market institutions 
across countries.  
Table 8 shows the results for the other two wage compressing institutions: 
unemployment benefits and the minimum wage. As with the case of collective 
bargaining coverage, unemployment benefits are associated to a bigger family gap. In 
all specifications the coefficient is bigger than its standard error and in two of the three 
specifications is significant at the 5% level. The magnitude and significance of the 
coefficient grows as other covariates are included in the model (also because of the 
positive correlation between institutions and their different effect on the family gap). As 
for the magnitude of the coefficient, if Nordic countries had the lower level of 
unemployment benefits of the group of Liberal countries, the family gap would decrease 
in the former by .10 log points or 49.9%. Adding the unemployment benefits variable to 
the model improves its fit, explaining now 41% of the variation of the family gap across 
time and countries. As in the case of collective bargaining coverage, an intuitive 
explanation of this result is that while unemployment benefits may raise the relative 
wage of mothers allowing them to find a better match, they may also encourage mothers 
to stay out of the labor market longer than otherwise, with the corresponding loss of job 
market experience. We have to recall here that the correlation coefficient between the 
generosity of unemployment benefits and the female unemployment rate in our sample 
is .14. The results for the minimum wage indicate that this variable is not related to the 
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family gap, although we should note that we were able to construct this variable for only 
ten of the thirty five countries in our sample. 
In relation to the effect of unemployment benefits and the minimum wage on the 
gender gap, Table 8 indicates that the minimum wage has a strongly significant and 
negative impact on the gender gap and that the level of unemployment benefits is not 
significantly related to the gender gap. 
Overall, the results in tables 6-8 indicate that policies that help mothers continue 
with the same employer/job after childbirth reduce the family gap, whereas policies 
aimed at raising the relative wage of mothers increase the family gap.  As mentioned 
before, one possible explanation for this is that wage compressing policies lead to rigid 
labor markets with high unemployment rates, which increases the length of spells out of 
employment by mothers around childbirth. Unfortunately, the ISSP data does not give 
information on the duration of spells out of employment around childbirth, so we cannot 
directly test this hypothesis. However, there is some indirect evidence that tends to 
support it. This evidence is shown in Table 9 and in Table 10. Table 9 displays the 
correlation coefficients across countries between the level of trade union coverage, 
unemployment benefits, the probability of a job interruption around childbirth and the 
percentage of women under part-time employment. In the ISSP data, approximately 
forty percent of mothers answered to the following question: “Did you stop working 
right after your child was born and during pre-school period?” For these mothers there 
is also information as to whether they were or not working before childbirth. Combining 
these two questions we calculated the probability that a mother interrupted her career 
because of a child spell (JOBINTERRUPT).  
Table 9 shows that in countries with a higher level of trade union coverage and 
more generous unemployment benefits, women face higher unemployment rates, 
mothers tend to interrupt their careers less frequently and are rarely employed in part-
time jobs. This is clearly consistent with a picture of rigid, ‘sclerotic’, labor markets in 
which mothers who transition out of employment either voluntarily or involuntarily 
because of a child spell may suffer a relatively long period of joblessness.11 In Table 10 
                                                          
11 Del Boca et al (2003) and Adserà (2002) argue that in such labor markets women delay their 
fertility decisions until they have secured an indefinite contract that protects them against the possibility 
of being laid off because of a child spell. 
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we break the family gap in equation (2) in two components. The first component is a 
proxy for the price effect associated to motherhood. We construct this price effect by 
removing from the family gap the impact of variables which we think are correlated 
with the job market experience and the tenure of mothers and non-mothers, i.e., 
potential experience (POTEXP), part-time status (PART), job interruption controls 
(JOBINTERRUPT) and the number of kids (KIDS). The price effect component is then, 
( ) ( ) UStEDMjtEDNMjtMjtNMjtjt educBBbbPRICEFFECT ⋅−+−= 00  (5) 
where the coefficients are estimated as in equation (1). The price effect is then the 
sum of two terms. The second term measures the difference in the returns to education 
between mothers and non-mothers ( )EDMjtEDNMjt BB − . Note that in this second term, we 
set the level of education to be the same for mothers and non-mothers and across 
countries, at the US level. This is then, a pure price effect due to a different price of 
education for mothers compared to non-mothers. The first term is the difference in the 
constant terms for mothers and non-mothers and is supposed to measure the extent the 
returns to unobserved characteristics are also different between mothers and non-
mothers. The human capital effect is simply the difference between the family gap in 
equation (2) and the price effect: 
 jtjtjt PRICEFFECTFAMILYGAPHCEFFECT −=  (6) 
The results shown in Table 10 should be taken with caution. Given that in the 
ISSP data we cannot measure job market tenure, it is possible that variables included in 
the PRICEFFECT component capture to some extent the human capital effect due to 
motherhood, and vice versa. Despite the data limitations we face, the results are broadly 
consistent with our previous intuition. In the case of the wage compressing institutions, 
the coefficients are always bigger than its standard errors for both the price and the 
human capital effects and have a negative sign in the case of the price effect but a 
positive one in the case of the human capital effect. In other words, according to the 
results in the table, wage compressing institutions reduce the gap between mothers and 
non-mothers with respect to the returns on a given set of skills, however, these 
institutions cause mothers to lose job market experience relative to non-mothers, which 
increases the family gap. In the case of the tenure enhancing institutions, as expected, 
all these institutions are associated to a lower human capital effect, although only the 
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parental leave variable remains significant. With respect to this last variable, the table 
also indicates that parental leave is associated to higher price effect.   
Table 11 decomposes the impact of each one of the labor market institutions in 
determining the family gap in each group of countries. The table shows the log points 
difference between the family gap in one group of countries and the sample average due 
to each of the labor market institutions. The family gap in the first column is the fitted 
values of the family gap in a regression against parental leave, job protection regulation, 
restrictions on the use of temporary contracts, trade union coverage, unemployment 
benefits and year dummies, subtracting from the fitted value the effect of the year 
dummies. The contrast between the group of Liberal and Nordic countries is particularly 
interesting. The former are representative of flexible, unregulated labor markets with a 
relatively low level of almost all labor market institutions, with the exception of 
restrictions to temporary contracts. Instead, the Nordic countries are the typical example 
of regulated labor markets with a relatively high level of almost all the labor market 
institutions. Since the effect of the two groups of labor market policies on the family 
gap is of opposite sign, Liberal countries benefit from the relatively low level of wage 
compressing policies, but get hurt by the relatively low level of tenure enhancing 
policies. Just the opposite story can be said in relation to the group of Nordic countries. 
The group of Southern European countries displays the typical picture of dual labor 
markets, with two differentiated segments, one heavily protected by strict firing 
restrictions, and possibly by unions, and the other subject to temporary, easy to 
terminate, contracts. This particular combination of policies seems to be the worst in 
relation to the family gap, since both the relatively low level of tenure enhancing 
policies (mainly due to the lax regulation of temporary contracts) and the relatively high 
level of wage compressing policies contribute to the large gap in Southern European 
countries, which is 26% higher than the sample mean.         
5. Robustness Tests 
In tables 12 to 14 we test the robustness of our results throughout different 
specifications, by including additional controls and changing the way we compute the 
family gap. For comparison purposes, the first column in Table 12 and the first two 
columns in Table 13 present our earlier results. In Table 12 we show the magnitude of 
the family gap across different specifications of step 1 of our methodology (equations 
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(1) and (2)). FAMILYGAP2 is the family gap estimated from individual earnings 
regressions on mothers and non-mothers including two additional controls that could be 
correlated with the family gap and the labor market institutions variables: a control for 
whether the mother stopped working around childbirth (JOBINTERRUPT) and a 
control for public sector employment (INPUBLIC). In FAMILYGAP2 the job 
interruption controls are allowed to vary by country, since the proportion of mothers 
that stop working around childbirth is potentially affected by the set of labor market 
regulations in each country. FAMILYGAP2 is then obtained from the following 
equation: 
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where the coefficients are obtained from individual wage regressions such as, 
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Finally, in the last column of the table, FAMILYGAP3 is the earnings gap 
between mothers and non-mothers assuming that mothers and non-mothers have the 
same levels of observable characteristics, except for the kids and job interruption 
controls which are mother specific: 
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 According to FAMILYGAP3, given that mothers and non-mothers have the same 
levels of observable characteristics, the main reason for a family gap is that the returns 
to the same skills are different between mothers and non-mothers.  
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The numbers in Table 12 show that, when additional controls are included, the 
difference in the family gap across countries grows, with the gap increasing in countries 
with an already large family gap and decreasing in countries with a relatively low 
family gap. The ranking of countries remains the same, with Southern European 
countries showing the biggest wage penalty for mothers, followed by the group of 
Liberal countries, Continental European countries, and Nordic countries. Also, and as 
one should expect, the magnitude of the family gap falls in all groups of countries in 
column 3, when we remove the difference in observable characteristics between 
mothers and non-mothers. But still in the case of FAMILYGAP3, the ranking of 
countries is the same as before. Overall, the results in table 12 show that the difference 
in the family gap in pay across countries is quite robust to the specification changes in 
step 1 of our methodology.  
In Table 13 we test the robustness of the results for step 2 across different 
specifications. In columns 2 and 3, we run regressions on the same vector of labor 
market institutions as before but now including as dependent variable FAMILYGAP2 
and FAMILYGAP3, respectively. In column 4, we regress FAMILYGAP against an 
alternative measure of unemployment benefits (SOCIALSEC), trade union power 
(COLLREL), and job protection regulations (EMPLAW). These new measures of labor 
market institutions come from Botero et al., (2004). SOCIALSEC stands for Social 
Security Laws Index and measures social security benefits as the average of: (1) Old 
age, disability and death benefits; (2) Sickness and health benefits; and (3) 
Unemployment benefits. COLLREL stands for Collective Relations Law Index and 
measures the protection of collective relations laws as the average of: (1) Labor union 
power; and (2) Collective disputes. EMPLAW stands for Employment Laws Index, and 
measures the protection of labor and employment laws as the average of: (1) Alternative 
employment contracts; (2) Cost of increasing hours worked; (3) Cost of firing workers; 
and (4) Dismissal procedures. 
The numbers in Table 13 show that the effect of labor market institutions on the 
family gap is very robust to changes in the specification of the dependent and 
independent variables. When additional controls are included (FAMILYGAP2), the fit 
of the model improves and both the significance and the magnitude of the coefficients 
grow. Under this specification, we are able now to explain 49% of the variation of the 
family gap across time and countries. In the case of FAMILYGAP3, not surprisingly, 
 21
the magnitude and significance of the coefficients fall (we are removing differences in 
observables between mothers and non-mothers as a source for the gap) but wage 
compressing institutions continue to be associated to a bigger family gap and tenure 
enhancing institutions to a lower one. In column 4, the new measures of labor market 
institutions have a similar impact on the family gap as the ones they replace, with a 
particularly strong effect for the SOCIALSEC variable. It should be noted, that these 
new measures of institutions are aggregates of measures that we previously 
disaggregated (for example, the EMPLAW measure is an average of job protection and 
restrictions to the use of alternative – possibly temporary – contracts), so it is not 
surprising that the fit of the model and the significance of the coefficients fall in column 
4 compared to the other columns. 
Since the family gap in Southern European countries is remarkably bigger than 
anywhere else across all specifications, in Table 14 we test the robustness of our 
previous results to the inclusion of a Southern Effect. It is possible, for example, that 
cultural factors explain the relatively large family gap in Southern European countries. 
If these cultural factors are correlated with the set of labor market institutions in these 
countries, then it is possible that all we are doing is to capture a Southern effect through 
the coefficients on the labor market institutions variables. We ask, then, to what extent 
our previous results are driven by extreme values of the Southern European countries. 
Table 14 indicates that as more variables are included in the specification, both the 
magnitude and the significance of the Southern effect fall. In the last specification, 
considering all the labor market institutions, the Southern effect loses its significance 
and, with the exception of RESTRICTEMP, the magnitude and significance of the labor 
market institutions controls remains remarkably similar to the ones we obtained before. 
The table suggests, then, that the Southern effect is nothing else than the combined 
effect of the set of labor market policies in Southern European countries.  
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have estimated the family gap in thirty five countries and have 
looked and the role of labor market institutions in explaining the cross-country 
differences in this gap. Our approach has been based on the hypothesis that a 
distinguishing feature of mothers is their need to transition in and out of the labor 
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market around childbirth and that labor market institutions affect both the probability 
and the length on such transitions. 
We have found that the wage penalty associated to motherhood varies 
significantly across countries. We found that mothers in Southern Europe suffer a wage 
penalty up to two times as large as mothers in Nordic countries.  
An important result of this study is that there is not much of a relation between the 
family and the gender gaps across countries. We found that often labor market 
institutions have opposite effects on these two sources of wage inequality and that hence 
the task of designing optimal policies to reduce both is not straightforward. In 
particular, our results indicate that protecting mothers against contract termination, 
either by use of parental leave or job protection regulations, would be the most effective 
way of reducing the earnings gap between mothers and non-mothers but also between 
men and women. Instead, policies traditionally associated to wage compression, 
although effective at lowering the gender gap, might lead to an increase in the wage gap 
between mothers and women without children. Our interpretation of these results is that 
an important reason mothers lag behind other women in terms of earnings is the loss of 
accumulated job market experience due to job transitions around childbirth. 
Furthermore, to the extent many women are also mothers, this is also an important 
reason for the wage gap between women and men. 
Finally, we compared and ranked groups of countries according to the magnitude 
of the family and the gender gaps. We found that mothers in Southern European 
countries suffer the highest family gap, although the gender gap is relatively low there. 
An important research question is how much of the extremely low fertility rates in 
Southern European countries (Adserà 2004, Del Boca et al 2003) can be explained by 
the high family gap. Also, the data we used in this study is cross-sectional and hence is 
not well suited to study in detail the frequency and length of job transitions that mothers 
go through around childbirth. Longitudinal datasets would be the natural alternative and 
we think that an important research topic is to look in more detail at the impact of labor 
market institutions on job transitions by mothers.      
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. List of countries and years. ISSP data. ‘Family and Changing Gender Roles’ study. 
Country 
Years Area Earnings Sample Size – all women* 
Australia 
1994, 2002 LIBERAL Annual gross wage and 
salary income (1994) 
Monthly net income 
(2002) 
790 
Austria 
1988, 1994 CONTINENTAL Monthly net income 
(1988) Monthly net 
earnings (1994) 
784 
Belgium 
2002 CONTINENTAL Net monthly income 709 
Brazil 
2002 OTHER Monthly earnings 1,016 
Bulgaria 
2002 EASTERN Monthly net income 623 
Chile 
2002 OTHER Monthly net income 843 
Cyprus 
2002 OTHER Annual income 506 
Czech Republic 
1994, 2002 EASTERN Monthly net income 818 
Denmark 
2002 NORDIC Annual gross income 752 
Finland 
2002 NORDIC Monthly income 745 
France 
2002 CONTINENTAL Monthly earnings 1,259 
Germany (East) 
1988 EASTERN Monthly net income 569 
Germany (West) 
1988, 2002 CONTINENTAL Monthly n et income 1,092 
Hungary 
1994, 2002 EASTERN Monthly gross earnings 
(1994) 
Monthly income (2002) 
815 
Ireland 
1994 LIBERAL Weekly net earnings 575 
Israel 
1994, 2002 OTHER Monthly earnings (1994) 
Monthly net income 
(2002) 
688 
Italy 
1988, 1994 SOUTHERN Monthly net income 529 
Japan 
1994, 2002 OTHER Annual gross earnings 659 
Latvia 
2002 EASTERN Monthly net income 576 
Mexico 
2002 OTHER Earnings 888 
Netherlands 
1988 CONTINENTAL Annual net earnings 984 
New Zealand 
1994, 2002 LIBERAL Annual gross income 593 
Norway 
1994, 2002 NORDIC Annual gross earnings 
(1994) 
Gross income (2002) 
960 
Philippines 
2002 OTHER Monthly income 600 
Poland 
1994, 2002 EASTERN Monthly net earnings 797 
Portugal 
2002 SOUTHERN Monthly net income 649 
Russia 
1994, 2002 EASTERN Monthly net earnings 1,187 
Slovak Republic 
2002 EASTERN Earnings 589 
Slovenia 
1994, 2002 EASTERN Monthly regular income 574 
Spain 
2002 SOUTHERN Monthly earnings 1,285 
Sweden 
1994, 2002 NORDIC Monthly gross earnings 
(1994) 
Monthly gross income 
(2002) 
628 
Switzerland 
2002 CONTINENTAL Monthly earnings 514 
Taiwan 
2002 OTHER Earnings 1,007 
United Kingdom 
1988, 1994, 2002 LIBERAL Annual gross earnings 1,098 
United States 
1988, 1994, 2002 LIBERAL Annual gross earnings 778 
* When a country appears more than one year in the data the number in the column is the average sample size across years. 
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Table 2. List of countries and information on labor market institutions. 
Country 
Parental Leave Job Protection Temporary 
Contracts 
Trade Union 
Coverage 
Unemployment 
Benefits 
Minimum Wage 
Australia X X X X X X 
Austria X X X X X X 
Belgium X X X X X X 
Brazil     X  
Bulgaria     X  
Chile     X  
Cyprus       
Czech Republic X X X X X  
Denmark X X X X X  
Finland X X X X X  
France X X X X X X 
Germany (East)       
Germany (West) X X X X X  
Hungary X X X X X  
Ireland X X X X X  
Israel       
Italy X X X X X  
Japan X X X X X X 
Latvia       
Mexico X X X  X  
Netherlands X X X X X X 
New Zealand  X X X X X 
Norway X X X X X  
Philippines     X  
Poland X X X X X  
Portugal X X X X X X 
Russia     X  
Slovak Republic X X X X X  
Slovenia     X  
Spain X X X X X X 
Sweden X X X X X  
Switzerland X X X X X  
Taiwan     X  
United Kingdom X X X X X X 
United States X X X X X X 
TIME-VARYING NO YES YES YES NO YES 
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Table 3. Correlation coefficients. Labor market institutions. 
 LEAVE PROTECTREG RESTRICTEMP COVERAGE UBENEFITS 
LEAVE 1         
PROTECTREG 0.4627 1       
RESTRICTTEMP -0.1653 -0.3152 1     
COVERAGE 0.3545 0.4197 -0.409 1   
UBENEFITS 0.6727 0.3018 -0.0996 0.2837 1 
Notes: LEAVE indicates the duration of the parental leave period; PROTECTREG indicates the strictness of regulations governing the firing of workers with regular contracts. 
RESTRICTEMP indicates the strictness of restrictions on the use of temporary contracts by firms. COVERAGE indicates trade union coverage. UBENEFITS indicates the 
generosity of social benefits to the unemployed. 
 
Table 4. Average family and gender gaps, male wage compression.  
 FAMILYGAP GENDERGAP SD SDRES 
Southern Europe .3560 .2864 .3136 .4792 
Liberal .3196 .3971 .4370 .4727 
Continental .2432 .3091 .3548 .4664 
Nordic .2088 .2602 .3245 .4810 
Other .1065 .4175 .3792 .4866 
Eastern .1404 .3080 .3261 .4857 
Note: FAMILYGAP and GENDERGAP are respectively the predicted family gap and gender gap evaluated at U.S. values for 
mother and non-mother, men and women characteristics; SD is the standard deviation of predicted log wages applying each 
country’s male wage equation to U.S. men; SDRES is the standard deviation of each country’s male log wage residuals calculated 
from its male wage equation. 
 
Table 5. OLS Regression results – Male wage compression 
 Dependent Variable = FAMILYGAP Dependent Variable = GENDERGAP 
 Coeff. t-stat (SE) Coeff. t-stat (SE) Coeff. t-stat (SE) Coeff. t-stat (SE) 
SD 
.2986 1.14 
(.2622) 
.3242 1.21 
(.2683) 
.3427 1.80 
(.1901) 
.3696 1.91 
(.1939) 
SDRES 
  1.1529 .54 
(2.1321) 
  1.2104 .79 
(1.5408) 
Year 
dummies 
YES YES YES YES 
Sample size 
54 54 54 54 
R2
.12 .12 .15 .16 
Note – SD is the standard deviation of predicted log wages applying each country’s male wage equation to US men. SDRES is the standard 
deviation of each country’s male log wage residuals calculated from its male wage equations. 
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 Table 6. Results for parental leave and job protection. OLS regressions. 
 FAMILY GAP GENDER GAP 
 Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) 
LVWEEKS -.0030 -1.87 (.0016) -.0025 
-1.37 
(.0018)         -.0017 
-.98 
(.0017) -.0027 
-1.65 
(.0016) -.0023 
-1.25 
(.0018) 
LVREP              -.0005 (.0008) 
-.64  -.0004 (.0008) 
-.53 
PROTREG        -.0578 -2.27 (.0255) -.0679 
-2.57 
(.0264) -.0558 
-1.85 
(.0301)  -.0165 
-.62 
(.0266) -.0068 
-.25 
(.0276) 
RESTRICTEMP            -.0173 (.0131) 
-1.32 -.0166 -1.23 (.0134)  .0166 (.0137) 
1.21 
Year dummies YES                  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample size 38         37 40 40 38 38 37 40 40
R2 .15         .17 .17 .21 .25 .16 .17 .11 .14
Note – LVWEEKS is the number of weeks for parental leave. LVREP is the replacement rate during parental leave. - PROTREG is the index of strictness of protection of regular jobs. RESTRICTEMP is an index of how difficult is for firms to hire workers under 
temporary contracts (the higher the index the more difficult this is). 
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Table 7. Results for collective bargaining coverage. OLS regression. 
 FAMILY GAP GENDER GAP 
 Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) 
COVERAGE .0004 .45 (.0010) .0011 
.83 
(.0013) .0010 
1.01 
(.0010) .0016 
1.49 
(.0011) -.0030 
-3.67 
(.0008) 
-.0030 
 
-3.13 
(.0009) 
RANK          -.1137 -.75 (.1512)   
PROTREG       -.0838 -2.83 (.0296) -.0684 
-2.17 
(.0314)   
RESTRICTEMP       -.0291 -1.82 (.0160) -.0262 
-1.62 
(.0161)   
LVWEEKS          -.0028 -1.55 (.0018) -.0009 
-.56 
(.0016) 
Year dummies YES            YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample size 34      34 34 32 34 32
R2 .05      .07 .29 .37 .34 .36
Note – LVWEEKS is the number of weeks for parental leave. LVREP is the replacement rate during parental leave. - PROTREG is the index of strictness of protection of regular jobs. RESTRICTEMP is an index of how difficult is for firms to hire workers under temporary contracts (the 
higher the index the more difficult this is).  COVERAGE is the percentage of employees affected directly or indirectly by trade union arrangements. RANK is the ranking of countries from the lowest level of trade union coverage to the highest. 
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Table 8. Results for unemployment benefits and the minimum wage. OLS regression. 
 FAMILY GAP GENDER GAP 
 Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) 
UBENEFITS .3933 2.96 (.1326) .4794 
2.67 
(.1795) .5898 
1.23 
(.4777)    -.0697
-.64 
(.1086) .2508 
.91 
(.2748) .5512 
1.24 
(.4455)   
MINWAGE               -.0511 -.14 (.3537) -.9942
-2.67 
(.3725) 
LVWEEKS           -.0038 -2.13 (.0018) -.0045 
-1.99 
(.0022) -.0024
-1.20 
(.0020)   
PROTREG              -.0560 -2.03 (.0276) -.0633 
-2.01 
(.0314) 
RESTRICTEMP              -.0312 -2.32 (.0135) -.0258 
-1.61 
(.0160) 
COVERAGE           .0013 1.20 (.0011) -.0034
-3.71 
(.0009) -.0032 
-3.35 
(.0009)   
Year dummies YES                YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample size 52        38 32 17 52 34 32 17
R2 .25        .39 .41 .15 .09 .36 .40 .47
Note – LVWEEKS is the number of weeks for parental leave. PROTREG is the index of strictness of protection of regular jobs. RESTRICTEMP is an index of how difficult is for firms to hire workers under temporary contracts (the higher the index the more difficult this is).  UBENEFITS 
is an index indicating the generosity of unemployment benefits. MINWAGE is the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage. COVERAGE is the percentage of employees affected directly or indirectly by trade union arrangements. 
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Table 9. Job interruptions, COVERAGE, UBENEFITS, Part-time employment. Correlation 
coefficients. ISSP data and Institutions data. 
 JOBINTERRUPT PART-TIME UBENEFITS COVERAGE URATE-FEMALE 
JOBINTERRUPT 1.0000     
PART-TIME .8016 1.0000    
UBENEFITS -.5832 -.2474 1.0000   
COVERAGE -.5025 -.3377 .5679 1.0000  
URATE-FEMALE -.4092 -.4789 .1391 .5949 1.0000 
 
Table 10. Price effect versus human capital effect. OLS regression. 
 PRICEFFECT HCEFFECT 
 Coeff t Coeff t 
UBENEFITS -3.7061 -1.02 3.7255 1.03 
COVERAGE -.0130 -1.33 .0154 1.58 
PROTREG .1032 .45 -.1756 -.77 
RESTRICTEMP -.0295 -.27 -.0031 -.03 
LVWEEKS .0246 1.50 -.0266 -1.63 
R2 .23 .29 
 
Table 11. Accounting for the difference in the family gap.    
 
Log points difference with the average of all countries due to: 
Region 
Family 
Gap 
Parental 
Leave 
Job 
Protection 
Temporary 
Contracts 
Trade 
Union 
Coverage 
Unemployment 
Benefits 
Tenure 
Enhancing 
Wage 
Compressing 
TOTAL 
DIFFERENCE 
SOUTHERN .360 .002 -.035 .075 .025 -.002 .042 .023 .066 
LIBERAL .349 .066 .080 -.042 -.023 -.027 .104 -.050 .055 
CONTINENTAL .302 .027 -.024 .007 .023 -.025 .010 -.002 .008 
OTHER .278 .033 -.021 .010 -.060 .022 .022 -.038 -.016 
NORDIC .247 -.126 -.017 .008 .025 .062 -.135 .087 -.048 
EASTERN .183 -.015 -.041 -.022 -.035 .001 -.078 -.034 -.111 
Note: FAMILY GAP are the fitted values using the coefficients of a regression of the family gap against parental leave, job protection regulation, 
restrictions on the use of temporary contracts, trade union coverage, unemployment benefits and year dummies, but omitting the effect of year dummies. 
TOTAL DIFFERENCE is the log-points difference in the family gap between a specific group of countries and the average of all countries in our sample. 
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Table 12. Family Gap in Pay. Different Specifications. 
 (1) FAMILYGAP 
(2) 
FAMILYGAP2 
(3) 
FAMILYGAP3 
Southern .356 .415 .269 
Liberal .319 .319 .190 
Continental .243 .268 .155 
Nordic .208 .210 .120 
Eastern .140 .103 -.010 
Other .106 .246 .069 
Difference in characteristics 
between mothers and non-
mothers 
YES YES NO 
JOBINTERRUPT NO YES  YES  
INPUBLIC NO YES YES 
 
Table 13. Results for various specifications. OLS regression. 
 (1) FAMILYGAP 
(2) 
FAMILYGAP2 
(3) 
FAMILYGAP3 
(4) 
FAMILYGAP 
 Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
UBENEFITS .5898 1.23 .8075 1.56 .3942 .63   
COVERAGE .0013 1.20 .0014 1.17 .0015 1.01   
PROTREG -.0633 -2.01 -.0620 -1.82 -.0545 -1.34   
RESTRICTEMP -.0258 -1.61 -.0442 -2.54 -.0385 -1.85 -.0181 -1.03 
LVWEEKS -.0045 -1.99 -.0058 -2.36 -.0033 -1.12 -.0054 -2.47 
SOCIALSEC       .9778 2.54 
COLLREL       .0287 .13 
EMPLAW       -.1051 -.58 
R2 .40 .49 .35 .32 
Difference in 
characteristics between 
mothers and non-
mothers 
YES YES NO YES 
JOBINTERRUPT NO YES  YES NO 
INPUBLIC NO YES YES NO 
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Table 14. Results for the Southern effect. OLS regressions. 
 FAMILYGAP 
 Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) 
LVWEEKS   -.0014 -.83 (.0017) -.0014 
-.82 
(.0017) -.0042 
-1.85 
(.0023) 
PROTREG -.0700 -2.84 (.0246) -.0605 
-2.12 
(.0285) -.0612 
-2.08 
(.0294) -.0653 
-2.06 
(.0316) 
RESTRICTEMP     -.0026 -.17 (.0153) -.0151 
-.76 
(.0200) 
COVERAGE       .0013 1.14 (.0011) 
UBENEFITS       .6042 1.26 (.4801) 
SOUTHERN .1707 2.32 (.0736) .1643 
2.18 
(.0755) .1562 
1.73 
(.0901) .0874 
.89 
(.0984) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Sample size 40 38 38 32 
R2 .28 .31 .32 .42 
Note – LVWEEKS is the number of weeks for parental leave. PROTREG is the index of strictness of protection of regular jobs. RESTRICTEMP is an index of how difficult is 
for firms to hire workers under temporary contracts (the higher the index the more difficult this is).  COVERAGE is the percentage of employees affected directly or indirectly 
by trade union arrangements. UBENEFITS is an index measuring the generosity of social benefits to the unemployed. SOUTHERN is a dummy variable with value 1 for 
Portugal, Spain and Italy. 
 
Figure 1. Family gap. Fitted values versus raw data. ISSP data. 
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Data Appendix 
 TENURE ENHANCING POLICIES WAGE COMPRESSING POLICIES 
 
LVWEEKS 
(weeks)1
LVREP 
(%)1
PROTREG 
(index)2
RESTRICTEMP 
(index)3
COVERAGE 
(%)4
UBENEFITS 
(index)5
MINWAGE 
(%)6
 1999-01 
1999-
01 
80s 90s 00s 80s 90s 00s 80s 90s 00s 90s 1986 2000 
SOUTHERN 20.6 93.3 3.5 2.9 2.9 0.9 1.6 2.0 70.0 73.3 80.0 0.80 0.53 0.35 
CONTINENTAL 15.5 95.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.6 2.6 77.5 79.1 77.1 0.75 0.58 0.52 
LIBERAL 8.0 28.5 0.9 1.1 1.2 3.5 3.5 3.3 59.0 49.5 37.25 0.71 0.48 0.47 
NORDIC 47.0 83.2 2.3 2.2 2.2 1.8 2.6 2.6 77.5 77.5 82.5 0.89 0.59 NA 
EASTERN 24.5 89.7 NA 2.7 2.7 NA 1.5 1.4 NA NA 36.2 0.81 NA 0.40 
OTHER 13.0 80.0 2.4 2.3 2.3 0.28 0.31 0.37 25.0 20.0 15.0 0.51 0.29 0.33 
Notes: 
SOUTHERN countries are Portugal, Italy and Spain. CONTINENTAL countries are Austria, Belgium, France, Netherlands, W. Germany and Switzerland. LIBERAL countries are Australia, Ireland, New 
Zealand, U.K. and U.S. NORDIC countries are Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. EASTERN countries are the Czech Republic, E. Germany, Latvia, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, Russia 
and Slovenia. OTHER countries are Brazil, Chile, Cyprus, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Philippines and Taiwan.   
1LVWEEKS is the number of weeks for parental leave. LVREP is the replacement rate during parental leave. Source: O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2001). Data is for the 1999-2001 period. 
2PROTREG is the index of strictness of protection of regular jobs; the higher the index, the stricter the protection against the dismissal of workers in regular jobs. Source: O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2004).  
3RESTRICTEMP is an index of how difficult is for firms to hire workers under temporary contracts. It indicates the number of valid cases for temporary contracts other than the usual objective reasons; the higher 
the index the more difficult is for firms to use temporary contracts. Source: O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2004).  
4COVERAGE is the percentage of employees affected directly or indirectly by trade union arrangements. Source: O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2004). 
5UBENEFITS is a one-time index of the generosity of unemployment benefits, combining information on the replacement rate and the duration of unemployment benefits. The higher the index the more generous 
unemployment benefits are. Source: Botero et al., (2004). 
6MINWAGE is the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage in each country. Source: O.E.C.D. Minimum Wage Database. 
 
 LVWEEKS 
(weeks) 
LVREP 
(%) 
PROTREG 
(index) 
RESTRICTEMP 
(index) 
COVERGAE 
(%) 
UBENEFITS 
(index) 
MINWAGE 
(%) 
 1999-01 1999-01 80S 90S 00S 80s 90s 00s 80s 90s 00s 90s 1986 2000
Australia 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.50 1.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 80.00 80.00 80.00 0.79 0.63 0.58 
Austria 16.00 100.00 2.90 2.90 2.40 2.75 2.75 2.75 95.00 95.00 95.00 0.63   
Brasil            0.56   
Bulgaria            0.84   
Chile            0.73   
Cyprus               
Czech 28.00 69.00  3.30 3.30  3.25 3.25   25.00 0.74  0.31 
Denmark 30.00 100.00 1.50 1.50 1.50 2.25 3.25 3.25 70.00 70.00 80.00 0.90 0.62  
Finland 52.00 70.00 2.80 2.30 2.20 2.50 2.50 2.50 90.00 90.00 90.00 0.91   
Flanders 15.00 77.00 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.00 2.25 2.25 90.00 90.00 90.00 0.86 0.57 0.49 
France 16.00 100.00 2.30 2.30 2.50 1.75 1.50 1.50 80.00 90.00 90.00 0.82 0.63 0.62 
GermanyE               
GermanyW 14.00 100.00 2.60 2.70 2.70 2.00 2.75 2.75 80.00 80.00 68.00 0.78 0.59  
Hungary 24.00 100.00 . 1.90 1.90  3.25 3.25   30.00 0.78  0.50 
Ireland 14.00 70.00 1.60 1.60 1.60 3.50 3.50 3.25    0.76  0.56 
Israel            0.85   
Italy 21.50 80.00 1.80 1.80 1.80 0.25 1.00 2.50 80.00 80.00 80.00 0.73 0.75  
Japan 14.00 60.00 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.00 2.25 2.75 25.00 20.00 15.00 0.82 0.29 0.33 
Latvia            0.80   
Mexico 12.00 100.00  2.30 2.30 0.25 0.25 0.25    0.00   
Netherlands 16.00 100.00 3.10 3.10 3.10 3.00 3.25 3.25 70.00 70.00 80.00 0.68 0.56 0.47 
NewZEaland    1.40 1.70 3.50 3.50 3.00 60.00 60.00 25.00 0.56 0.47 0.46 
Norway 42.00 100.00 2.30 2.30 2.30 1.25 1.50 1.50 70.00 70.00 70.00 0.82   
Philippines            0.00   
Poland 18.00 100.00  2.20 2.20  3.50 2.50   40.00 0.83  0.38 
Portugal 24.30 100.00 4.80 4.30 4.30 1.50 2.00 2.00 70.00 70.00 80.00 0.85 0.47 0.38 
Russia            0.90   
Slovak 28.00 90.00  3.60 3.50  3.25 3.50   50.00 0.79  0.41 
Slovenia            0.86   
Spain 16.00 100.00 3.90 2.60 2.60 1.00 2.00 1.75 60.00 70.00 80.00 0.81 0.37 0.32 
Sweden 64.00 63.00 2.90 2.90 2.90 1.00 3.25 3.25 80.00 80.00 90.00 0.94 0.57  
Swiss 16.00  1.20 1.20 1.20 3.50 3.50 3.50 50.00 50.00 40.00 0.74   
Taiwan            0.67   
Uk 18.00 44.00 0.90 0.90 1.10 3.50 3.50 3.50 70.00 40.00 30.00 0.78 0.46 0.42 
US 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.20 3.50 3.50 3.50 26.00 18.00 14.00 0.66 0.37 0.36 
Notes: 
SOUTHERN countries are Portugal, Italy and Spain. CONTINENTAL countries are Austria, Belgium, France, Netherlands, W. Germany and Switzerland. LIBERAL countries 
are Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, U.K. and U.S. NORDIC countries are Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. EASTERN countries are the Czech Republic, E. Germany, 
Latvia, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, Russia and Slovenia. OTHER countries are Brazil, Chile, Cyprus, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Philippines and Taiwan.   
1LVWEEKS is the number of weeks for parental leave. LVREP is the replacement rate during parental leave. Source: O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2001). Data is for the 
1999-2001 period. 
2PROTREG is the index of strictness of protection of regular jobs; the higher the index, the stricter the protection against the dismissal of workers in regular jobs. Source: 
O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2004).  
3RESTRICTEMP is an index of how difficult is for firms to hire workers under temporary contracts. It indicates the number of valid cases for temporary contracts other than the 
usual objective reasons; the higher the index the more difficult is for firms to use temporary contracts. Source: O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2004).  
4COVERAGE is the percentage of employees affected directly or indirectly by trade union arrangements. Source: O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2004). 
5UBENEFITS is a one-time index of the generosity of unemployment benefits, combining information on the replacement rate and the duration of unemployment benefits. The 
higher the index the more generous unemployment benefits are. Source: Botero et al., (2004). 
6MINWAGE is the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage in each country. Source: O.E.C.D. Minimum Wage Database. 
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